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1. Introduction 
The Niger Delta crisis has, in very recent times, taken a dangerous 
dimension, underscoring the degeneration of the issue due to the failure 
of the government at all levels, and other non-state actors, including 
multinational companies (MNCs), to bring the crisis to an end. The 
emergence of militias and cult groups in the last three years points to the 
aggravation rather than the resolution of the conflicts. The govemmenfs 
seeming complicity in protection of the MN Cs, using instruments of state 
force to protect foreign companies, has multiplied illegal means and 
instruments to fight the cause of "economic and social emancipation", as 
some militants claimed in February 2007 in an interview by Jeff 
Koniange of the American Cable News Network (CNN). This study 
examines the protracted Niger Delta crisis, exacerbated by oil, 
ecological and socio-ethnic factors, and its implication for Nigeria's 
external relations. It does this by revisiting the many unresolved issues, 
including the Ogoni crisis, which explain the escalation of the crisis. 
However, it has been observed that studies on tbe crisis largely 
demonstrate neglect or ignorance of the centrality of ecological 
undercurrents and attendant deprivations in the crisis which accounted 
for its internationalization and ultimately culminated in the pariah status 
Nigeria earned in the 1990s because of its mishandling. Put differently, 
while social and relative deprivation is considered primary and 
environmental issues are looked at as the seconda1y causes of the problem 
in some studies (in some, it is reduced to politicaLand some ethnic or 
communal causes), the impact of the Niger Delta problem on Nigeria's 
relationship with the international community is the only consideration in 
some others; efforts to situate the environmental issues in the eventual 
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world attention are infinitesimal and insignificant, or almost non-existent. 
This paper attempts to correct that and strengthen the perspective that the 
activities of the oil companies created enormous ecological problems in 
addition to the abjection of the people, which led to internal strife, 
government highhandness in the matter, and mounting international 
concern. The prejudicial condemnation and murder of environmentalist 
leaders of the Movement for Survival of the Ogoni People (MO SOP) fuelled 
world consternation and eventual isolation of Nigeria in the international 
system, while the increasingly deplorable condition of the peoples to date, 
is the major cause of the illegal means of warfare, as we can now see. 
This study therefore considers the role of environmental issues in the 
Niger Delta crisis. TI1e link between the environmental issues and conflict 
in the Niger Delta is established, while the role of the government in the 
crisis, its protection of Multinational Oil Compailies at the expense of its. 
own people, and elimination of enviromnental activists including Ken 
Saro-Wiwa in the mid 1990s, are discu~sedK However, the emergence of 
vicious militant groups, such as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Dc;1ta 
(MEND) etc., and their many incursions on the economic and resource 
base of the region which constitute a setback to Nigeria's economic 
development, coupled with the huge environmental crisis in the region, 
represent the economic cost of the phenomenon and also explain the 
international dimensions of the crisis. 
Clarification of Terms 
The following terms are the key words in the paper which must be 
clarified to make the discourse comprehensible: 
Economics of Nationalism - This explains the huge economic burd~n 
that Nigeria experiences as a result of the conflict in the Niger Delt:t: It 
includes vandalization of oil pipelines, abduction of oil workers including 
expatriates, intermittent fighting among groups, impeding activities of oil 
companies, oil spillage and gas flaring that damage the environment and 
other natural resources. The abduction of workers, vandalization, 
conflict in the Niger Delta and the emergence of militant groups are 
manifestations of the extreme "nationalism" aimed at fighting perceived 
injustices and committing oil companies to perform their so-called 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). These militant activities stall 
economic develop111ent in the country. 
Restless Run of Locusts - "Restless nm''. refers to the perpetual 
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restiveness or persistent agitations of the militant groups and other 
peoples of the Niger Delta. Such people use different means to fight 
perceived injustices, including constitutional, illegal, political and passive 
means to fight the oil companies and the government which they believe 
are responsible for their economic, social and environmental woes. 
Locusts connote "pests' that charge up the Niger Delta. These pests are 
the 'leaders of thought', militants and terrorists operating in the region. 
2. Background to the Niger Delta Crisis 
The Niger Delta region covers an estimated area of 20,000 km2 within 
wetlands of 70,000 km2 formed primarily by sediment deposition. It is 
located in the south-south geographical region of Nigeria and has a 
population of about 20 million people made up of many ethnic 
nationalities. The region comprises nine states which include Abia, 
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. 
However, the core Niger Delta region includes the three states of 
Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. The vegetation of the Nigerian coastal area 
is characterized by mangrove forests, brackish swamp forests and rain 
forests. The country's extensive mangrove ecosystem, a great proportion 
of which lies within the Niger Delta and found mainly in the Rivers, 
Delta, Cross River, Akwa !born, Lagos and Ondo states, is estimated to 
cover between 500,000 and 885,000 hectares. Freshwaters start at the 
northern limit of the mangrove ecosystems and extend to the Sahelian 
region (Kuruk, 2004). The Delta environment is made up of four major 
ecological zones which include: mangrove swamp forests, fresh water 
swamps, coaster barrier islands, and lowland rainforests. Thus, the well-
endowed ecosystem of the Delta is simply incredible as it can naturally 
sustain more species of fresh water fish, economic trees, and a wide 
variety of crops than any other ecosystem in West Africa. 
In 1956, Shell British Petroleum (now Royal Dutch Shell) discovered 
crude oil at Oloibi1i, a village in the Niger Delta, and commercial 
production began in 1958. Today, there are 606 oil fields in the Niger 
Delta, of which 360 are on-shore and 246 off-shore. (Nigeria Country 
Analysis Brief, 2005). Nigeria is now the largest oil producer in Africa 
and the sixth largest in the world, averaging 2. 7 million barrels per day 
(bbl/ d) in 2006. Nigeria's economy is heavily dependent on· earnings 
from the oil sector, which provides 20% of the GDP, 95% of foreign 
exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues (CIA World 
Fact Book, 2005 cited in Nwilo and Badejo, 2006)·: 
The Niger Delta crisis is unarguably related to environmental problems 
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in the area, which surprisingly, is closely linked to the activities of its oil 
industry. It is surprising because the region holds some of the world's 
richest and finest deposits of crude oil but ironically the people living in 
the area are poorer than ever, no thanks to the MNCs and successive 
national and regional governments. According to Friends of the Earth, 
(FOE, 2004), Nigeria's oil wealth has been exploited for more than 45years. 
But while oil companies including Shell, ExxonMobil and TotalFinaE!f, 
have profited from the resour~eK local communities in the oil rich but conf!ict-
ridden areas live with the daily pollution caused by non-stop gas flaring -
where the gas associated with oil extraction is burnt off into the atmosphere. 
More gas is flared in Nigeria than anywhere else in the world - in Western 
Europe, 99 per cent of the associated gas is used or re-injected into the 
ground. But in Nigeria, despite regulations introduced more than 20 years 
ago to outlaw the practice, most associated gas is flared, causing local 
pollution and contributing to climate change. 
Besides, the problem of oil spills, deliberate destruction of the 
mangrove to pave way for pipelines, disappearance of the aqua-life (ag11in 
due to oil spills and the frequent movement of heavy ships), etc. are 
common occurrences in the Niger Delta. With the rate of degradation, 
the region could suffer a loss of some very significant percentage of its 
inhabitable terrain in the foreseeable future if nothing urgent is done to 
salvage the ugly situation. In fact, the experiences of the people of this 
region over the years can accurately be described as the tragedy of 
exploitation and has re-echoed the resource-curse argument. 
Niger Delta communities had expressed discontent and ventilated their 
grievances through political and constitutional means against the 
marginalization and environmental abuses of their soil and water from the. 
time of independence (fhe News, 2006). In more recent times, particularly 
from the 1990s, they had become mo)"e restive and violent in their protests 
against the activities of foreign oil companies, notably Royal-Dutch Shell 
(Shell Petroleum Development Company). Their grievances have focused 
on the deteriorating conditions of life brought about by air and water 
pollution, land degradation and the socioeconomic impact of oil exploration 
on the local communities. The 1990s witnessed an outburst of violence 
against transnational oil corporations and the seeming government 
conspiracy with them, and the use of one ethnic group against another or 
infiltration by TN Cs/ government of ethnic groups with black-sheep, which 
bred grave intra and inter ethnic hostilities (Agbese, 2002). 
Tk government's complicity in the crisis fou.nd manifestation in the 
deployment of heavily armed military personnel to guard oil facilities, 
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operations and expatriates and the MNCs (Ikpatt, 2001). In addition, oil 
companies have had to recruit jobless local youths to watch over oil interests, 
thus setting local people against themselves. The official reason given 
however, was that the presence of heavy security would act as deterrence 
to aggressive communities from destroying oil installations. The rationale 
behind this was controversial as it also showed insensitivity to the 
fundamental causation of persistent conflict, namely, abjection and denial. 
3. Impact of Oil Industry on the Environment in the Niger Delta 
Some of the major environmental concerns of the negative exploratory 
activities of oil companies in the Niger Delta include oil spillage and gas 
flaring in the area. The net effect of these shortcomings have expectedly 
made life extremely difficult in the region. Nwilo and Badejo, (2006) in 
support of the foregoing, have pointed out that "since the discovery of oil in 
Nigeria in the 1950s, the country has been suffering the negative 
environmental consequences of oil development. The growth of the country's 
oil industry, combined with a population explosion and a lack of 
enforcement of environmental regulations has led to substantial damage 
to Nigeria's environment, especially in the Niger Delta region". Akpofure 
et al, (2000) cited in Nwilo and Badejo (2006), clarify that "when there is 
an oil spill on water, spreading immediately takes place. The gaseous and 
liquid components evaporate. Some get dissolved in water and even oxidize, 
and yet some undergo bacterial changes and eventually sink to the bottom 
by gravitational action. The soil is then contaminated with a gross effect 
upon the terrestrial life. As the evaporation of the volatile lower molecular 
weight components affects aerial life, so the dissolution of the less volatile 
components with the resulting emulsified water, affects aquatic life". Other 
studies have also shown that oil on the water surface also interferes with 
gaseous interchange at the sea surface and dissolved oxygen levels will 
thereby be lowered. This will, no doubt, reduce the life span of marine 
animals. Micro-organisms also degrade petroleum hydrocarbons after 
spillage (Atlas, 1981; Leahy and Colwell, 1990; Atl~s and Bartha, 1992). 
Oil spill incidents have occurred in various parts and at different 
times along our coast. Some major spills in the coastal zone are the 
GOCON's Escravos spill in 1978 of about 300,000 barrels, SPDC's 
Forcados Terminal tank failure in 1978 of about 580,000 barrels and 
Texaco's Funiwa-5 blow out in 1980 of about 400,000 barrels. Other oil 
spill incidents are those of the Abudu pipe line in 1982 of about 18,818 
barrels, the Jesse Fire Incident which claimed about a thousand lives 
and the ~doho ·Oil Spill of January 1998, 0f about 40,000 barrels. The 
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most publicized of all oil spills in Nigeria occurred on January 17, 1980 .. 
when a total of 37.0 million litres of crude oil got spilled into the 
environment. This spill occurred as a result of a blow-out at Funiwa 5 
offshore station. Nigeria's largest spill was an offshore well blow-out in 
January 1980 when an estimated 200,000 barrels of oil (8.4million US 
gallons) spilled into the Atlantic Ocean from an oil industry facility, that 
damaged 340 hectares of mangrove (Nwilo and Badejo, 2005). Table 1.0 
below provides a summary of oil spill incidents in Nigeria between the 
period 1976 and 1998. These figures are official figures which in most 
cases may not adequately report all cases of oil spillage. 
TABLE LO: OIL SPILL DATA FOR NIGERIA 
S/NO Year Number of Quantity spilted 
Spill Incidents (barrels) 
1 1976 128 26,157.00 
2 1977 104 32,879.25 
3 1978 154 489,294.75 
4 1979 157 694,117.13 
5 1980 241 600,511.02 
6 1981 238 42,722.50 
7 1982 257 42,841.00 
8 1983 173 48,351.30 . 
9 1984 151 40,209.00 
10 1985 187 11,876.60 
11 1986 155 12,905.00 
12 1987 129 31,866.00 
13 1988 208 9,172.00 
14 1989 195 7,628.161 
15 1990 160 14,940.816 
16 1991 201 106,827.98 
17 1992 367 51,131.91 
18 1993 428 9,752.22 
19 1994 515 30,282.67 
20 1995 417 63,677.17 
21 1996 430 46,353.12 
22 1997 339 59,272.30 
23 1998 390 98345.00 
Total 5724 2,571,113.90 
Source: The Department of Petroleum Resources, Nigeria (cited in Nwilo & Badejo, 2001) 
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It is important to note here that spilled oil is most of the time lost to 
the environment. For example, Nwilo and Badejo, (2006) pointed out 
that "Available records for the period of 1976 to 1996 indicate that 
approximately 6%, 25%, and 69% respectively, of total oil spilled in the 
Niger Delta area, were in land, swamp and offshore environments. Also, 
between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria recorded a total number of 2,097 oil 
spill incidents." 
The other major negative consequence of oil exploration and 
exploitation is the incidents of gas flaring. This is a practice whereby the 
associated gas accompanying the production of crude oil is burnt off so 
as to maximize the production of crude oil. However, the prevailing 
consensus worldwide regarding gas flaring is that it is wasteful 
economically and environmentally. The burning of ga~ by flaring leads 
to the emission of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. Venting of 
the gas without burning, a practice for which flaring seems often to be 
treated as a synonym, releases methane, the second main greenhouse 
gas. It is therefore very disturbing to note that associated gas flaring 
continues unabated in Nigeria. For instance, a report by Friends of the 
Earth (2005) shows that, "More gas is flared in Nigeria than anywhere 
else in the world. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, but roughly ·2.5 
billion cubic feet of gas associated with crude oil is wasted in this way 
everyday. This is equal to 40% of all Africa's natural gas consumption in 
2001. while the annual financial loss to Nigeria is about US $2.5 billion. 
The flares have contributed more greenhouse gases than all of sub-
Saharan Africa combined. And the flares contain a cocktail of toxins that 
affect the healfu and livelihood of local communities, exposing Niger 
Delta residents to an increased risk of premature deaths, child 
respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer." 
The same report further disclosed that "The flaring of associated gas 
(AG) in the Niger Delta is a human rights, environmental and economic 
monstrosity. Nowhere else in the world have communities been 
subjected to it on such a scale. It is estimated to cost Nigeria US $2.5 
billion annually, whilst the roaring, toxic flares affect the health and 
livelihoods of Delta inhabitants." 
In terms of how much is flared, the Friends of the Earth (2005) report 
estimated that "For the first 20 years or so of the industry, almost all the 
AG was flared: 2.1 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) or 92% in 1981 for 
example. This percentage barely declined during the 1980s, standing at 
about 88% in 1989. It seems to have reached about 2.6 'bcf/d in the late 
1990s, including venting, though by then this was about 75% of all gas 
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production. Whilst OPEC has suggested that flaring has since dropped 
below 2 bcf/d, and whilst both OPEC and the Nigerian Department of 
Petroleum Resources have suggested that gas flared as a percentage bf 
all gas production has dropped below 50%, this is not universally 
accepted." Whatever is the situation, the :figures are still alarming 
particularly when a comparative analysis of the situation is undertaken. 
The table below provides a summary of the estimated volume of flared 
gas in some selected countries. 
TABLE 2.0: BEST ESTIMATE OF GAS-FLARING TRENDS IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES (2000) 
Country Flared Gas Share of World Ratio of Gas Flared 
total (%) to Total Produced 
1990 2000 
Algeriia 6.8 6 79 101 
Angola 4.3 4 n/a** 118 
China 3.2 3 n/a** 74 
Egypt 0.9 1 37 23 
Indonesia 4.5 4 66 66 
Iran 10.5 10 70 56 
Nigeria 17.2 16 250 166 
Mexico 5.6 5 n/a 33 
North Sea* 2.7 3 ,18 9 
Russia 11.5 11 n/a 77 
Venezuela 4.5 4 30 27 
United states 2.8 3 10 22 
Other countries 33.0 30 
World 107.5 100 
Source: Cedigaz, USEIA, 0 PEC, IEA, World Bank, HIS Energy Group 
*North Sea - Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom.Germany and 
Netherlands do not flare gas, (Cedigaz, 2000) 
**n/a - Not available 
A careful consideration of the above Table shows that Nigeria comes 
out as the world's number one flarer and venter on both absolute and 
proportionate bases, whether based on OPEC figures for Nigeria "for 
2001, which is 16.8 bcm/y, or on Cedigaz data,. in which case, Nigeria 
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accounted for 19.79% of the global amount estimated to be a total world 
flaring volume of 84.87 bcm, in 2001. This amount surprisingly is more 
than those of the second and third countries combined, and four times 
higher than the nearest African country, Algeria, which is recorded as 
having flared and vented 4 bcm. European flaring is put at 2.54 bcm, or 
0.76% of gross production; US flaring is at 2.97 bcm, or 0.43% of the gross 
production, while world total gross production in 2001 was 3150.13 bcm, 
with 84.87 bcm or 2.69% flared and vented. 
Gas flaring Ocontributes significantly to climate change. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC (2001) in its report 
stated that "the global average surface temperature increased by about 
0.6°C over the 20th century, that it was 66-90% confident that most of the 
observed warming over the second half of the century was due to the 
increase in greenhouse gas concentrations, and projected that the 
temperature would increase from 1990-2.100 by 1.4 to 5.8°C. It also stated 
that global mean sea level is projected to rise by 0.09 to 0.88 metres 
between 1990 and 2100, due primarily to thermal expansion and loss of 
mass from glaciers and ice caps." This has serious implications for 
northern Nigeria where the problem of desertification has become very 
disturbing. According to UNEP (1997), "Desertification in Africa has 
already reduced by 25% the potential vegetative productivity of more 
than 7 million km2, or one-quarter of the continent's land area. It will 
lead to more people being unable to live in the countryside and to an 
increase pressure on urban areas." Flaring in Nigeria is widely believed 
to have contributed more emissions of greenhouse gases than all other 
sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined. The World Bank ( 2002) sums 
up the scale of Nigerian flaring as follows: 'The most striking example 
of environmental neglect has been in the oil sector, where natural gas 
flaring has contributed more emissions of greenhouse gases than all 
other sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined." 
Within the Niger Delta, there is a common but firm belief that gas 
flaring is damaging the health of the local people. This stems from the fact 
that flaring of AG from oil production facilities is like setting a match to a 
large container of petrol. The· enormous heat they emit simply would not 
permit any life (plant and animal) around them to survive. The content of 
the to~ic emissions resulting from the combustion of AG in this open, 
uncontrolled manner usually "is a mix of smoke, more precisely referred 
to as particulate matter; combustion by-products, including sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen dioxides and carcinogenk substances, such as benz[a]pyrene 
and dioxin; and unburned fuel components, including benz~neI toluene, 
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xylene, and hydrogen sulfide." (Friends of the Earth, 2005). 
Exposure to these pollutants impact human health adversely. 
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. 
EPA): "Many scientific studies have linked breathing particulate matter 
to a series of significant health problems, including: aggravated asthma, 
increases in respiratory symptoms like coughing and difficult or painful 
breathing, chronic bronchitis, decreased lung function, and premature 
death." Also, according to the U.S. EPA: "It has been clearly established 
and accepted that exposure to benzene and its metabolites causes acute 
nonlymphocytic leukemia and a variety of other blood-related disorders 
in humans." (Cited in; Friends of the Earth, 2005). Gas Flaring is thus 
considered to be a likely cause of premature deaths and cases of 
leukemia in the Niger Delta. 
One other well established health damaging consequence of gas 
flaring includes high incidences of acid rain which the Delta residents 
have long complained about; particularly, how their corrugated roofs . 
have been corroded by the composition of the rain that falls as a result 
of flaring. The primary cause of acid rain are emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which combine with 
atmospheric moisture to form sulfuric acid and nitric acid, respectively. 
Acid rain acidifies lakes and streams and damages vegetation. In 
addition, acid rain accelerates the decay of building materials and paint. 
Prior to falling to the earth, S02 and NOx gases and their particulate 
matter derivatives, sulfates and nitrates, contribute to visibility 
degradation and harm public health. In the Delta, an oily hue is often 
observed on collected rain water (Friends of the Earth, 2005). 
The report further added that the observation that gas flaring in the 
Niger De1ta is causing acid rain is also backed by the U.S government's 
Energy Information Administration, which states:· "The continued 
process of gas flaring has not only meant that a potential energy source 
-. and source of revenue - has gone up in smoke, but it is also a major 
contributor to air pollution and acid rain." 
4. The Spatial Economy of the Debased Environment and Conflict 
Social deprivation constructs an economy of abjection (Folarin, 2007) 
The term 'abjection' literally means the state of being cast down. For 
Robert Barnhart (1996), abjection refers to abasement. In contemporary 
critical theory, it is often used to .describe the state of often:.. marginalized 
groups. The concept finds expression in the works of Kristeva (2005) 
which denotes rejection. 
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The connexion of abjection to spatial economy is the habitation of the 
former in the compelling outcome of the latter. A growing number of the 
abjected naturally increases an empty economic space of poverty that the 
abjected or socially and economically debased essentially occupy. 
'Spatial' denotes a large habitation with no expected economic reward or 
leverage vis-ii-vis the privileged other. A spatial economy of abjection 
finds multitudes, including the downtrodden, social outcastes and 
economically dep'rived, competing for space and scarce resources. In his 
study, Lyotard(l990) reflects on "the Jews' predicament", positing that 
the trauma of racism, the violence of such forms of exclusion and 
abjection, introduce another excess which cannot be translated, for the 
monolingual discourse of "identitY" has no place for the excluded, except 
as reminders, or as supplement; the other is thrown into the forgetting 
of disavowal. For the minoritarian other who is the abjected, the identity 
mirrored in the gaze misses or misrecognises its phantasized ideal and 
must recognize its lack-of-being at both levels of the psychic and the 
social. 
The inevitable results of the spatial struggle in an economy of 
abjection is the further engraving of disempowerment and cleavages that 
erode the possibility of a united front to engender change in status, 
prevail on policy, or compel favourable outcomes as was the case in the 
Niger Delta and more particularly in Ogoniland. Such divisions are 
perpetuated by the hegemonic class through systematic policies of divide 
and rule and the full utility of physical force. In post-colonial Nigeria, 
there is a conspiracy between the military-political class and the 
. bourgeoisie who represent the metropolitan powers and use foreign 
policy to fester the nests of the neocolonial lords who keep them in power. 
What results is relative and social deprivation. Relative deprivation 
connotes socio-economic denials that ultimately culminate in abjection. 
According to Lea and Young (1984) who see relative deprivation from 
the group perspective, deprivation occurs when a group feels deprived 
in comparison to other similar groups, or when i!s expectations are not 
met. Deprivation is in diverse manifestations. However, ToWilsend 
(1987) identifies material and social deprivation. Material deprivation 
covers dieting, clothing, housing deprivations, and deprivations of home 
facilities, environment, location and deprivation of work. Social 
deprivation, on the other hand, covers lack of employment rights, 
deprivation of family activity, lack of integration into the community, 
lack of parUcipation in social institutions, recreatiorlal deprivation and 
educational deprivation. 
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Social alienation would inevitably result. The alienated finds himself 
more and more isolated and alienated from society, alienation not only 
from his work, but alienation from society, state (and) from those with 
whom he is working, and alienation even from himself. In the final 
analysis, for Varma, such individuals or groups are haunted by an 
inferiority complex and remain in a state of perpetual anxiety, fear, and 
worry (Varma, 2000). This is symptomatic of the completion of the 
process of subordination and humiliation by the powerful dass that has 
always wanted him out of the economic space. 
Such a state of abjection arising from conspired suppression, when it 
peaks, will culminate in conflict. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1971) in 
agreement with the postulates of John Dollard, Leonard Doob et al 
(1939), for instance, argue that the long-term consequence of the 
deprivations and alienations is usually conflict- it becomes a battle of 
wits between two unequal classes, but with the weaker classes or the 
minoritarian other, losing out in tussle. This has characterized the Niger 
Delta area from independence to our period of study and beyond. 
5. Niger Delta Conflicts, Global Response and Nigeria's 
External Relations 
By 1970, about 300,000 barrels of crude oil had been spilled in the Niger 
Delta area (Earth Action, 1994). According to Shell, the spillage was an 
act of sabotage by the Biafran army as they were losing in the civil war 
(Shell, 1995). Shell figures also show that from 1985 to early 1993, 5,352 
barrels of oil were spilled in 87 incidents in Ogoniland after their staff 
had been withdrawn. The tendency had been for state officials and oil 
companies to blame the problems on sabotage by local communities. For 
instance, Shell claimed that out of 87 instances of oil spillage in 
Ogoniland between 1985 and 1993, 60 (about 70%) were sabotage acts. 
The figure tallied with government claims that out of 11 incidents in 
Ogoniland in 1990, eight or 73% were due to sabotage (cited in 
Okerenta, 2006). 
Damages to the environment in Ogoniland went along with 
deprivation. Consequently, local leaders protested against these 
injustices. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) reduced public 
spending, and subsidies to goods such as petrol, which led to the rise of 
pump price of petroleum products from N 0.75/litre in 1986 to N 11/litre 
in 1996. Th,ese severely affected standards of living .and hardship 
everywhere, particularly in the oil-producing areas. Evideh.ce of conflicts 
began to show before 1980, but the situqtion worsened in the second half 
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of the 1980s and in the 1990s. However, because oil exploration by multi-
national oil corporations had increased with the expanding space of 
squalor, the Niger Delta people began to hold oil companies and the 
government responsible for their deprivation. They lamented, for 
instance, the failure of the two institutions to construct new (or at least 
rehabilitate existing) roads, schools, hospitals, and provide opportunities 
for employment, suppo1i for farming, and indeed do everything to 
improve their livelihood. Oil companies and the government insisted that 
these claims were exaggerated as they were sometimes outrageous and 
indecorously demanded (Rowell and Kretzmann, 1999). 
For instance, in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which was presented to the 
government in October 1990, the Ogoni people claimed that their land 
had provided Nigeria 30 billion dollars in oil revenue from 1958 with 
little or no infrastructure development in Ogoniland to justify the oil 
exploration: no representative whatsoever in institutions of the Federal 
Government, or pipe borne water, electricity, jobs or inclusion in the 
opportunities available at the oil companies, etc.. Further, the Ogoni 
claimed in the Bill of Rights: 
Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are underdeveloped 
and are about to disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages 
are being forced on us. Shell Company does not employ Ogoni 
people at a meaningful or any level at all in defiance of the 
Federal Government's regulations. The search for oil has 
caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni, one of the 
most densely populated areas of Africa. Ogoni people lack 
education, health and other social facilities. It is intolerable 
that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in abject 
poverty and destitution (1992). 
In response, Shell, the government and seven other neighboring oil-
producing communities like Asa-Ndoki, dismissed these claims (Shell, 
1995); Daily Champion, 1994; The News, 1995). However, it was relative 
deprivation, the gap between expectation and actualization, like the one 
in the foregoing claims that explain why men rebel (Gurr, 1974), and 
more importantly, that explicates the Niger Delta conflicts. 
Osaghae (1995) argues that the approach of minorities in their 
demand for better living condition hitherto were passive, namely 
through delegation and petitions to the state and oil firms. The failure of 
these means to engender meaningful changes may explain why the 
Ogonis decided on a different line of action in the early 1990s. In 1990, 
a non-political organization comprising Ogoni elite and traditional rulers 
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known as KAGOTE, whose origin dates back to the 1970s, drew up and 
presented to the state, the Ogoni Bill of Rights. Among other things 
highlighted earlier, they demanded political autonomy within Nigeria 
and a fair access to and use of oil revenue derived from Ogoniland to 
develop their homeland and language, as well as protection from Shell. 
As an instrument to pursue the actualization of the demands in the Bill 
of Rights, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was 
set up in 1990. The organizational structure of MOSOP consisted of the 
following subgroups: National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), 
Federation of Ogoni Women Association (FOWA), Ogoni Teachers 
Union (OTU), National Union of Ogoni Students (NUOS), Conference of 
Ogoni Traditional Rulers (COR), Council of Ogoni Professionals (COP), 
Ogoni Welfare Association (OWA), Council of Ogoni Churches (COC), 
and the Council of Ogoni Leaders of Thought (COLT). 
MOSOP followed up the Bill of Rights with intense campaigns at both 
the national and international levels with a view to publicizing the Ogorti 
predicament. In that effort, the Bill was presented to the United Nations 
Sub-Committee on Human Rights on the Prevention from Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, the African Human Rights Committee and 
several other non-state actors such as the General Assembly of the 
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples' Organization at the Hague in 1993 
(Okonta, 2000). The government and Shell initially responded to the Bill 
with indifference. However, as MOSOP began to secure public and 
international support, the state reacted by banning ethnic organizations 
and others such as MOSOP and the Ethnic Minority Rights Orgar.iization 
of Africa (EMIROAF), both led by Saro-Wiwa. These two organizations 
and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People were the three main 
organizations, which spearheaded the Ogoni insurrection. 
Relating it to the Bill of Rights, MOSOP wrote to Shell, Chevron ar.id 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in December 
1992, asking for a favourable disposition to Ogoni demands or 
evacuation from the land. Other demands included the payment' of $6 
billion in accumulated rents and royalties for oil exploited in Ogoni 
fields from 1958; reparation of $4 billion for soil, water, and air pollution; 
cessation of gas flaring; and commencement of negotiation with the 
Ogoni people. According to Osaghae(l995), the significance of the letter 
to the companies was that it demonstrated the people's loss of confidence 
in the state. According to them, it was time for 'the Ogoni to fight for 
their own salvation because there is no go':ernment to deliver us."(ibid). 
No wonder on January 4 1993, a day set aside by the UN for 
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celebration of the World's Indigenous Peoples, also declared as Ogoni 
Day, in spite of the government ban on all public gatherings and 
demonstrations and a decree making self-determination struggles 
treasonable and punishable by death, an estimated 300,000 Ogoni staged 
a massive de.monstration in Ogoniland against Shell. The previous day, 
at a thanksgiving service held by the tomb of Timothy Paul Birabi, a 
frontline Ogoni leader highly reverenced the Ogoni history, orations and 
speeches inciting the Ogoni to fight against the social and environmental 
injustices had been given. The first Ogoni graduate, Paul Birabi, 
organized the Ogoni State Representative Assembly to join other 
minorities in Rivers province to demand a separate Rivers State from the 
Eastern region in the 1960s. In his speech, one of the vice presidents of 
MOSOP, Edward Kobani, had said: 
w~ have come to this sacred ground to reaffirm our 
determination to fight with every drop of blood in our vein that 
the Ogoni man cannot be a slave in our God given country. We 
have come to get inspiration to carry us through the days 
ahead (Osaghae, 1995). 
On 13 March 1993, MOSOP organized a night vigil throughout 
Ogoniland. The vigil, which took place in churches, involved prayers for 
deliverance and processions. By Thursday 29, April, Wilbros, an 
American Company, contracted by Shell to lay oil pipelines from the 
Bomu oil fields in Ogoni across the River Niger, started bulldozing 
community forests and freshly planted farmlands in the village of Biafra, 
under armed protection. The security forces brutalized a female farm 
owner who challenged the destruction and protested. The following day 
about a thousand Ogoni protesters marched against Wilbros and their 
military escort. In the ensuing confrontation, many Ogoni were 
wounded, a mother of five, K. Kogbara was shot, and her hand was 
subsequently amputated, and Mr. Friday was shot dead. At the funeral 
for the dead, MOSOP leader, Edward Kobani remarked: "The death of 
(Friday) will no doubt act as a tonic for the Ogoni Struggle. When blood 
is spilled, the fight can no longer be abandoned" (Amanyie, 2001). 
In a move that was to infuriate most Ogoni, particularly the National 
Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), the youth Wing of MOSOP, a 
handful of prominent Ogoni traditional chiefs and elit::! took a full page 
advertisement in a newspapet in which they apologized to the 
government over the incident leading to the death of Friday. Moreover, 
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the signatories disowned MOSOP and called on the government to 
clamp down on the organization. Predictably, the public denunciation 
incensed Ogoni youths who f~lt betrayed by their elders. The latter were 
quickly labelled anti-Ogoni elements and feeling unsafe in the ensuing 
anger that followed, they escaped and ran for government shelter in Port 
Harcourt. On June 2, 1993 the Ogoni voted to boycott the approaching 
June 12 presidential election. ·while President Babangida canvassed for 
participation of Ogoni, Saro-Wiwa and some MOSOP members called for 
a general boycott in Ogoniland. But Kobani and others wanted 
participation and this led to dissent in the group. Saro-Wiwa and a few 
other leaders were arrested and arraigned (Baxter, Horsman, 
Kretzmann, I996). 
Violent communal clashes followed, with the Andoni, another oil 
producing community attacking the Ogoni town of Kaa on August 5, . 
1993. The Kaa market and several buildings were set ablaze. When the 
dust settled, casualties on the Ogoni side stood at 150 persons dead .. 
Subsequent violent clashes resulted in the deaths o.f over a thousand 
Ogoni and the displacement of some 3,000 persons(Greenpeace, 1996). 
Survivors' account of the attacks emphasized the use of sophisticated 
assault weapons; grenades and mortars were used in the fight. The 
Ogoni argued that a small fishing Andoni community could not tnuster 
the expertise and military skill required to use such military instruments 
effectively. Following the clashes, the Rivers State government, in 
October 1993 set up a reconciliation committee, the Rivers State Peace 
Conference Committee under Professor Claude Ake to broker peace 
between the Ogoni and their Andoni neighbours. Reacting to a hastily 
drawn up peace accord to which he was not privy, Ake resigned his 
chairmanship of the body arguing that, 
... reports on the conflict have noted the scale and systematic 
nature of destruction as well as the sophistication of the 
operations. These features raise questions about whether the, 
conflict is merely communal clash and the possibility that the 
two communities might have beenvictims of other forces 
exploiting a local situation (Amanyie, 2001). 
Ake referred to the peace accord as cosmetic, unable to expose the 
deep causes of the clashes as unconcerned about the fate of its displaced 
victims. Saro-Wiwa also refused to sign the peace accord for, among 
other things, the Clause 6 o; the document tacitly opened the way for 
return of Shell leading to 'The immediate resumptjon of full economic 
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and social activities within Ogoni and Andoni areas." This suggested a 
ploy to smuggle Shell back into Ogoniland. Shell had earlier pulled out 
of Ogoniland in 1993 following the massive anti-Shell demonstrations, 
spearheaded by MOSOP, Greenpeace and other environmental 
organizations and the severe beating of a Shell worker in January 1993 
(Greenpeace, 1996). 
Violence was again unleashed on the Ogoni, but this time, from the 
Okrika. Regardless of explanations given for the attacks, the Amayanabo 
(king) of Okrika, S.P.U. Ogan and Saro-Wiwa affirmed that there was no 
land dispute between the two. But the aftermath of the Ogoni-Okrika 
dispute was brute force, which soldiers deployed to suppress the crisis, 
with hundreds of Ogoni being the victims, a development believed to be 
'politically contrived' to deal with the Ogoni (African Guardian, 1993). 
The Ogoni crisis reached a head in 1994. On May 21, 1994, a mob, 
chanting war songs, stormed the palace of the Gbenemene (traditional 
ruler) of Gokana, where certain Ogoni chiefs were holding court. An 
Ogoni youth who saw some "vultures" at the meeting was alleged to 
have mobilized other Ogoni youth who invaded the palace. Four of the 
"vultures" were clubbed to death, as the fifth one, Alhaji Mohammed, 
saved himself by taking refuge inside the shrine of the Ogoni spirit, a 
place which the assailants regarded too sacred to desecrate. Meanwhile, 
earlier in the day, a detachment of security operatives had mounted a 
roadblock a short distance away, preventing Saro-Wiwa from entering 
the village. Later in the evening, when news of the mayhem reached 
Port Harcourt, Major Paul Okuntimo's Rivers State Internal Security 
Task Force invaded Ogoniland. At least fifty Ogoni were killed, hundred 
arrested and properties worth millions of naira destroyed (Maier, 2003). 
A few days later, Saro-Wiwa, his deputy, Ledum Mittee and eight others 
were arrested and charged before a military tribunal fqr murder. 
Although the evidence of the prosecution were fraught with 
contradictions, and despite the fact that no credible witness was 
produced to substantiate the allegation that the nine organized the 
murder, the tribunal convicted and sentenced Saro-Wiwa and eight 
others to death by hanging. While disagreeing with the procedures and 
verdict of the tribunal, Saro-Wiwa's attorney pressed him to accept 
responsibility for the killings because of the climate of intolerance he 
engendered. 
The Ogoni cri.sis attracted international attention and reactions. The 
matter · had been internationalized earlier ·by ·the adoption and 
presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights in October 1990, and the 
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presentation of the Ogoni case before the United Nations, as well as the 
recognition bestowed on MOSOP by the UNPO (Unrepresented Nations 
and People's Organization) meeting held at the Hague. The agitations, 
human rights abuses by federal and state authorities and ecological 
degradation by the Shell oil company, and the excesses of state terror in 
Ogoniland by the dreaded Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, 
inevitably externalized the domestic crisis. It is pertinent to note that in 
contemporary global politics, human rights and the environment are no 
longer issues of domestic concern. Because such issues may explode the 
international system, world leaders and states intervene positively and 
swiftly. This explains the limits of sovereignty in international 
organizations, particularly when states are contracting parties to some 
conventions on human and environmental issues. The defence by the 
Nigerian Minister of External Affairs that the world had no business in · 
the happenings in Nigeria and the government handling of the Ogoni 
crisis, was, as such, a ruse. Among other diplomatic blunders, Tom 
Ikimi, accused the United ptate~ of arrogating to itself the role of global 
policeman of democracy and lampooned . the South African President, 
Nelson Mandela, for advocating sanctions against Nigeria in the 
aftermath of the hanging of Saro-Wiwa and eight others. In one of his 
characteristic unguarded remarks, Ikimi retorted, 
We in Nigeria have held President Nelson Mandela in high 
esteem. Nevertheless, our experience as a people and a nation 
in world affairs, tells us that the successful struggle for 
liberation does not automatically endow a newcomer to the 
international arena with all the miances to perform creditably. 
And also, whoever gave the South African the song sheet to 
read has not done him honour (Fawole, 2004). 
This came on the heels of Abach"a's uncomplimentary remark on 
Mandela when he said: "I don't blame Mandela because, having spent 
27 years in detention, he has lost touch with the socio-political tr~nd in 
the world" (The News, 1995). Instead of tactful diplomatic fence-mending 
with Nigeria's traditional friends and allies in the Commonwealth, an 
unguided propaganda was mounted to launder the regime's soiled image 
and condemn perceived and imagined enemies .. This did not do much 
good as the regime was unable to regain the confidence and support of 
the international community (Fawole, 2004). The two-year suspension by 
the Cor:lmonwealth was n·ot reversed in spite of all"·entreaties by the 
junta, leading a frustrated Ikimi to decry the Commonwealth as "not a. 
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serious Organization. They have done nothing for Nigeria. They have 
only come out with declarations or statements which they cannot carry 
out." (Fa;.vole, 2004). · 
As noted earlier, it was on account of Nigeria's violation of the Harare 
Declaration on Human Rights in 1991, to which Nigeria was a 
contracting party, that compelled the Commonwealth to suspend Nigeria 
in 1995. 111e 1991 Harare Commonwealth Declaration also included the 
resolve of member-states of the organization to promote democracy and 
good governance. Also, as a member of the UN, Nigeria was aware of 
existing treaties and conventions on fundamental human rights and 
freedoms to which it was bound by being a signatory. These include the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948) which is. 
a general but yet comprehensive document dealing with Human Rights 
and whose provisions were breached in the Ogoni case. Articles 5 and 
9 specifically provide for safeguards against subjecting human beings "to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" and 
against "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (UNDR, 1948). 
The Ogoni crisis, which complicated the country's existing national 
c1isis, exacerbated by the lingering "June 12" problem, called for the 
prompt response of the world community, most of whom reacted by 
recalling their ambassadors, or the imposition of visa and travel 
restrictions on . rnilitary personnel and government officials. The 
European Union placed restrictions on Nigerian sportsmen, and Canada 
broke diplomatic relations with Nigeria. Nigerians had to obtain 
traveling visas from Canada's consular office in Accra. Worse still, the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) contemplated more 
comprehensive sanctions, and the UN also sent a fact-finding. team 
whose comprehensive report severely indicted the regime for gross 
violations of human rights in Ogoniland (Maier, 2003). 
Perhaps the Ogoni issue might not have elicited much passion and 
concern if not for the fact that the problem of environmental pollution 
and degradation had become a global concern. The world had come to 
terms with the fact that the environment was the common heritage of 
mankind and that environmental .degradation in any country could not 
be overlooked because it carried trans-border harm across nations. The 
issue of environment thus focused the global searchlight on the activities 
of multinational oil corporations, whose relentless drive for oil 
exploration and the attendant unscrupulous drive for pr0fit often 
culminated. in environmental abuse ancl lack of concern for their host 
communities, especially in the developing countries. In the Niger Delta, 
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the ruthless activities of the Royal Dutch Shell oil company had to come 
into sharp focus because it was the main culprit in Ogoniland. The 
Ogoni protest further raised national and international concerns about 
the oil company's culpability in the wanton destruction of the entire 
Niger Delta environment (Okerenta, 2006). 
Rather than take the necessary measures to assuage the wounded 
feelings of the Ogoni people, the Abacha regime embarked on a ruthless 
military pacification by establishing and deploying the notorious Rivers 
State Internal Security Task Force in Ogoniland. The regime took steps 
that further made it lose credibility in the international system For 
instance, it set up in November 1995 a 50-man National Committee of 
Traditional Rulers and Leaders of Thought, to advise it on sensitive 
diplomatic problems. Made up of illiterate traditional rulers, old 
politicians from the First and Second Republics and other apologists of . 
the regime, it was headed by General Jeremiah Useni, Abacha's 
personal friend. The ad hoc body did more damage than good because 
its real purpose was to shore up the junta's sagging legitimacy, 
organizing huge rallies in all the state capitals and Abuja where rented 
crowds on television, were impelled to openly condemn the 
Commonwealth and other international organizations. 
The hangings increased negative global reactions, which had trailed 
the junta from its infamous cancellation of the democratic process in 
November 1993 and the arrest and detention of Chief Abiola, winner of 
the 1993 presidential elections. It was quite obvious to observers of 
Nigeria's military dictatorship that by the arrest of Saro-Wiwa and the 
others, their detention without charge for nine months under the most 
primitive prison conditions, their eventual trial and conviction by a 
special tribunal without the slightest pretense of adhering to due process, 
the junta's haste in confirming the sentence without having received the · 
full records of the proceedings of the tribunal as required by the Civil 
Disturbances Act, and the gruesome execution of the convicts barely 48 
hours later without having been allowed to plead for clemency, the 
Abacha regime violated every known rule of civilized conduct. (Fawole, 
1999). 
The recourse to state violence to crush internal rebellion was 
considered uncivilized by the international community, and had, in the 
past, even been instrumental in the interventions in Cambodia, Panama, 
Uganda, South Africa during apartheid, and more recently Iraq. The 
global community condemned the ·regime and called for sanctions 
against it The timing of the execution of the Ogoni Nine coincided .with 
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the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand, in 1995. It was 
embarrassing to a global community that had pleaded for clemency· so 
much and had been assured even by Ikimi at the Summit that the 
Abacha regime was redressing the issue. Nelson Mandela had even 
staked his personal integrity to persuade the Summit not to take a hard-
line action against Nigeria, having been assured by General Abacha that 
all would end well (Fawole, 2004). 
It was even more ridiculous that just when Ikimi had finished 
addressing the Summit and had granted an interview to the world press 
that the Nigerian government was not and had not hanged the Ogoni 
leaders, he was confounded when news reached him that they had been 
hanged. Unable to secure any concession to ease its international 
isolation, the regime, using Ikimi and other sycophants, including 
former members of the June 12 winning team, and high profile 
emissaries, embarked on the search for new allies in and out of Africa. 
In Africa, fellow dictators and states isolated in the international system 
like Nigeria, gave their endorsement to the regime. They included 
Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, General Omar El-Bashir of the Sudan, 
Colonel Barre Mainassara of Niger Republic and President Yahya 
J ammeh of Gambia. In fact, Colonel Gadaffi was allowed to defy a 
subsisting UN air embargo by flying to Nigeria in a highly publicized 
visit. Both Gadaffi and Mainassara were also awarded Nigeria's highest 
national honour, that of the Grand Commander of the Order of the 
Federal Republic (GCFR) during their solidarity visits to the country. 
With the European Union countries maintaining their sanctions and the 
Commonwealth unrelenting in its criticism, a~ with the breaking of 
diplomatic relations with Canada, the international isolation became 
compounded. High profile delegations were also dispatched to other 
unpopular dictatorships like Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the rather 
simplistic justification being that "since the Wes tern allies have decided 
to abandon us, we might have to look elsewhere." An attempt was even 
made for Nigeria to become a member of the D-8, a group of eight 
developing Islamic nations spearheaded by Turkey, to further shore up 
its international credibility. Overtures were also made to the 
Francophone Community in the face of Commonwealth hostility, and 
France gave 'its support to Abacha. 
The international reprisals of the mismanagement of the domestic 
Ogoni crisis were also manifested in sports and other social events. For 
;nstance, the much advertised hosting right.for the Flr'A World Youth 
Championship, to be given Nigeria, was withdrawn, and Nigeria's. 
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participant at the Miss World Beauty Pageant in South Africa was 
disgraced as she was not recognized in the pageant. Nigeria could not 
overly press its claims to the disputed Bakassi Peninsula and had to 
follow Cameroon to the World Court for judicial settlement. 
Further, the UN Commission on Human Rights at its 5znd session in 
Geneva in April 1996 condemned the regime for continued \folation of 
human rights; the Commonwealth through its Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Committee proposed the freezing of the personal 
assets of Nigerian rulers, imposition of a comprehensive ban on sporting 
activities, severance of air ties unless the regime took urgent measures 
towards speedy restoration of democratic rule and showed respect for 
human rights. The repoti of the Fact-Findit)g Mission of the UN 
Secretary General to Nigeria also severely indicted the regime for gross 
violation of Human Rights and the rule of law, and recommended a 
quick return to democracy, among other things. 
The Abacha regime, in short, simply sacrificed Nigeria's age-long 
hard-earned international respect and goodwill ·on the altar of 
incompetence and inordinate ambition to crush all local and external 
challenges in Abacha's quest to consolidate his powers. He might have . 
wanted to arrest a repeat of the 1994 Rwanda ethnic violence and 
genocide, which came after and soon occurred side by side with the 
Niger Delta communal skirmishes in 1993-1994 which probably explains 
his highhandedness in Ogoniland; but the acts earned his regime and 
Nigeria a place in the pantheons of infamy. 
6. The Economics of the Niger Delta Conflicts 
The cost of the Niger Delta struggle/conflicts in economic terms may 
never really be adequately estimated. Every party in the conflicts (the oil 
MNCs, the Nigerian state, the people of the Niger Delta, and of course, 
the international community) appears to be mostly concerned with 
immediate benefits to interests represented. However, the over\ll1 
adverse consequence of the situation is rarely considered. · 
The people who have been in the struggle over the claim to a decent 
living as well as a decent environment, have been abused, oppressed, 
and suppressed by the elite using the instrument of the state. The reason 
for this is quite obvious; the people are of little or no economic relevance 
to the government. This is because the government .need not depend on 
them for raising any significant revenue needed to run the state. The 
state thus over the years has misplaced its primary responsibility of 
protecting lives and prop("rty to that of protecting the multinationals at ·. 
 by guest on March 7, 2015jnr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Environment ... Revisiting the Oil Issue ... in the Niger Delta 163 
the very expense of the people it is meant to govern. The masses of the 
Niger Delta people have gradually become an undesirable "liability" to 
the government instead of an asset. The people have, in turn, made the 
region much more expensive to govern and to do business, through the 
activities of militant groups in the area. This, in any case, is completely 
avoidable in the first instance. 
The multinationals who seek more profits at the expense of the 
region, have over the years opted for the cheaper but immoral and 
criminal alternative of flaring and venting gas, and have, in the process, 
messed up the environment and wasted resources e'len in the midst of 
hunger in the faces of so many around them. As stated earlier, it is on 
record that a financial loss to Nigeria of about US $2.5 billion annually 
is traceable to gas flaring. Besides, the associated loss of lives and 
failing health can never be sufficiently evaluated. The international 
community at large is also paying heavily as these MNCs contribute 
their unsolicited fair share of toxic emissions to the environment, 
thereby increasing the problem of global warming and rising sea levels 
all over. Moreover, every disruption in the supply of crude from the 
Niger Delta has consistently had its adverse impact on the world prices 
of crude oil. What this means is that everybody all over has had to pay 
more for petroleum products. 
The international community has not done enough to stem the ugly 
tide. For example, the World Bank has been widely criticized over its 
inability to require the use of AG before approving its credit guarantees 
for the financing of the West African Gas Pipeline Project. Yet, the bank 
has since November 2004, approved US$125 million in guarantees 
supporting the construction of a 678 km gas pipeline to transport natural 
gas from Nigeria to Benin, Ghana and Togo - the West African Gas 
Pipeline (WAGP). 
7. Conclusion 
This study has been able to review environmental issues central in the 
Niger Delta crisis. It relocated the · issues and -~ubsequent conflicts 
within the uncommon perspective of the effective impact of domestic 
policies on the foreign policy or external relations of a state. More 
importantly, the study has looked at the different costs of the emergent 
militant nationalism in the delta on national development and ihe 
international relations of Nigeria. The study also discovered that the 
successive regimes in Nigeria considered the oil TNCs with which they 
had personal business, paramount !n Nige:·fa's national -interest ranking, 
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and that probably explains the disposition of their foreign policies to 
protecting their business interests and securing their stakes in the Niger 
Delta. 
The Abacha approach seemed to have reared its ugly head again in 
the President Obasanjo era. The continued neglect of the Delta areas 
despite increased exploration activities of many new foreign oil 
companies, a development prodded by an aggressive campaign by the 
Obasanjo administration for foreign investment, exacerbated the Delta 
crisis. Several other militia movements have emerged in reaction to 
government over-protection of the exploitative oil companies, growing 
impoverishment, the emergence of more slum settlements, and above 
all, increased environmental degradation. The NDPVF under Alhaji 
Asari Dokubo, among others in the struggle, has been abducting 
expatriates, holding MNCs and their home government to ransom and 
sometimes asking for ransom fee, and have been asking the same old 
question, namely, good living for Deltans, social responsibility on the 
part of the oil companies and the government's attention by way of • 
physical and economic development, meaningful allocation from the. 
huge revenues coming from oil-producing areas, as well as the control 
of activities capable of destroying the eco-system in the Delta region. It 
is hoped that the Yaradua-Jonathan initiative to dialogue with all stake 
holders and deploy resources to the Delta for social rehabilitation and 
structural development would be faithfully implemented and yield some 
dividends. 
It is pertinent that the oil companies be more perceptive of the plight 
of the people and be more socially responsible by contributing to their 
welfare, provide jobs for them, construct good roads, build decent low-
cost housing for them, increase academic scholarship awards to their 
children, build schools and hospitals, provide water and electricity to the 
communities, etc. Put differently, the problem would be lessened when/ 
oil companies get more committed to their agreement with the 
government and the host communities of ensming that they carry {mt 
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to their host commy.1iities 
and avoid indulging in unethical activities. 
Talking about Corporate Social Responsibility, companies and 
government should pay attention to the problem of infrastructure 
(including roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, drinkable water, electricity, 
etc) in the Niger Delta , which is long overdue. There is the need for 
both the gov.::rnment, at various levels, and the multinatiqnal oil 
companies, to invest massively in infrastru~ture in this region just as it 
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has been done in Lagos and Abuja. This will ensure that the 
environment is tidied up, made much more comfortable to live in, and 
the economically idle but restive youth in the area are engaged in the 
meantime, and of course provided some profitable means of livelihood. 
Further, the youth can be more profitably engaged if they are 
encouraged to go to school. This can be engendered by a policy of 
provision of scholarships (compulsory and free quality education up to 
the tertiary level) to children from this area so as to empower them 
economically and make them much more useful to the state in the 
future. 
Moreover, the question of who controls the natural resources located 
in a given region can be answered by the convocation of a national 
conference whose recommendations should first be subjected to a 
referendum. This will allow for a consensus by all stakeholders and a 
more enduring arrangement for the smooth operation of the oil industry, 
which is urgently needed for the stability of the world market and the 
Nigerian economy. 
On the political frontier, there is a need to shift presidential power to 
the region, so as to complete the cycle among all the geo-political regions 
in the country. This will allow for equity in the polity, give the people a 
sense of belonging, and douse tension that is already mounting. This 
expectation has been partially satisfied now since the incumbent Vice 
President of the country is from the region. However, it must be 
emphasized here that nothing short of the position of the President of 
Nigeria will adequately pacify the Niger Delta people in their quest for 
a taste of political office in the country. 
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